Computer Chess Club Archives


Search

Terms

Messages

Subject: Re: The Chess Room Argument [by John R. Searle]

Author: Christophe Theron

Date: 08:49:26 03/21/01

Go up one level in this thread


On March 21, 2001 at 00:56:37, Robin Smith wrote:

>On March 20, 2001 at 23:33:10, Christophe Theron wrote:
>
>>On March 20, 2001 at 19:16:20, Robin Smith wrote:
>>
>>>On March 20, 2001 at 01:50:10, Christophe Theron wrote:
>>>
>>>>That's it.
>>>>
>>>>Let me give another example, for which I have fought here for quite some time.
>>>>
>>>>If a player A is better than player B at fast time controls, I just begin to
>>>>assume that player A will be better than player B at longer time controls.
>>>>
>>>>From that point, if I notice that it might not always be the case, I might work
>>>>to provide evidence that it is not the case.
>>>>
>>>>But my first idea is to keep things simple and see if it works. So I would first
>>>>assume that time controls do not matter. I change my mind and add complexity to
>>>>my model only if I can prove that my "simpler" model does not work.
>>>>
>>>>I do that because I noticed a long time ago that general concepts are much more
>>>>powerful. A general concept (or "idea" or "principle") is one you can apply in a
>>>>large number of cases. So I try to keep my ideas as general as possible. It
>>>>hurts me when I have to add special cases to an otherwise "clean" (simple)
>>>>model.
>>>
>>>Christophe, I believe your assumption here is generally correct.  The principle
>>>even has a name, "Occams razor" named after a philosopher and theologian,
>>>William of Occam, who lived ~700 hunderd years ago.
>>>
>>>But I do have good evidence that in at least one case, Fritz5.32, it is not.  I
>>>am convinced Fritz5 is much weaker than comparable programs when playing at
>>>super long time controls.  My guess is this is probably due to heavy use of root
>>>processing.
>>
>>
>>It might be, but you understand that my point is not to discuss if it is or if
>>it is not.
>
>OK
>
>>>  But starting first with the simplest assumptions makes excellent
>>>sense.
>>>
>>>>I do not know what to do with the concept of "conscience". I don't need it to
>>>>cover a hole in the big picture of "intelligence", and it explains nothing
>>>>anyway. Worse: those who talk about it find it mysterious and impossible to
>>>>explain.
>>>
>>>Correct.  It is similar to trying to explain vision to a person blind since
>>>birth, you can explain the mechanics, but not what it is like, on a subjective
>>>level, to be able to see a beautiful flower.  Unless you share the experience,
>>>just explaining the mechanics doesn't explain everything.
>>
>>
>>Let me try something about "conscience". I'm trying hard to understand what you
>>mean, I don't want to look too stubborn. :)
>>
>>Could it be that we call "conscience" the part of the information processing
>>entity (notice how I avoid the term intelligent entity) which is monitoring the
>>rest of the entity?
>>
>>If I understand correctly the word "conscience", being conscient is to be able
>>to "realize" that I am thinking about something, or that I am saying this or
>>that. Or that I am currently looking at a flower. True?
>>
>>In this case, "I" is the part of the entity which is not conscient (or less
>>conscient?), and the "conscience" is the part that collects only the higher
>>level informations. The conscience continually monitors the state of "I".
>>
>>All the process of converting the signal received by a light sensor (eye,
>>camera...) and coming to the conclusion that a flower is in front of the light
>>sensor is out of the reach of "conscience". "I" do it, but conscience is not
>>involved at that stage.
>>
>>When the signal is finally converted into the symbol "flower", the "flower"
>>connection is activated, which in turn is going to activate a number of related
>>concepts. Like a control panel where suddenly some lights turn on. The
>>conscience only sees this controls panel, and the entity then *thinks* "I see a
>>flower".
>>
>>BTW this means there would also be two kinds of "memory". What happens can be
>>memorized in an "unconscient" memory (maybe a kind of memory for low level
>>events), and also in the conscience, as a sequence of high level events.
>>
>>Notice that by this "definition", an entity can "lose consciousness" without
>>being totally unable to respond to external signals. What is going to happen is
>>that the entity will respond only with its lower level processing abilities, and
>>will not "record" the sequence of events ("I" responding without being
>>conscient).
>>
>>Wow, sounds terribly close of what can happen to a human being.
>>
>>I guess my reasonning sounds very naive to people who have studied psychology. I
>>feel like I am re-inventing the wheel. :)
>>
>>Anyway, if this model of "conscience" makes some sense, then I don't see any
>>reason why it could not be implemented in transistors rather than in neurons...
>>It is possible, because this definition of conscience does not mention the level
>>of complexity of the symbolic processing unit which is the conscience.
>>
>>Notice BTW that by this definition, a high level processing unit (or a symbolic
>>processing unit) can be called a "conscience" only when it is connected to the
>>"real world" thru a set of interfaces directly connected to this world. Here I
>>want to emphasize the fact that -maybe- a conscience cannot exist without a
>>world to which it is connected.
>>
>>OK, now I think I have gone too far. :)
>
>The hypothesis you are describing is very close to one I read in a Scientific
>American article.  I think it was from 1995 or thereabouts.  And I think the
>hypothesis has a very good chance of being essentially correct, though like many
>good hypotheses it not only answers a question but creates new questions as
>well.  One nice aspect is that it addresses the issue of why a sleeping person
>(and sleeping brains are still VERY active) is in what is called an unconcious
>state ..... the sleeping brain is probably *not* engaged in trying to relate "I"
>to "the world".  Now if only someone could devise an experiment to test this
>hypothesis I would be happy.



The brain does what Windows98 does when it is idle: system maintenance,
defragmentation...

The idea is that the body must stop most of its activities for technical
reasons. While the body "sleeps", there is very little stimulations from the
outside world, so there is no need to use all the information processing
abilities for monitoring the outside world.

What to do then? Well it's a good time for "conceptual only" processing.
Organizing ideas and concepts, trying to extract more meaning from recent
experiences, defining plans for the future, and so on...

Isn't it what we do when we are dreaming?



>>>> So in short it raises questions you cannot answer, or that you do not
>>>>need to answer! I fail to see how it helps me to understand anything about
>>>>"intelligence" (a concept supposed to be closely related).
>>>>
>>>>So I just drop it for now...
>>>
>>>Let me know if you want to take it up again later.
>>
>>
>>I hope I have not been too long. :)
>
>Not at all.  But now we should probably let CCC get back to comp chess.  Feel
>free to e-mail me if you wish to discuss it further.


Yes, back to chess.



    Christophe



This page took 0 seconds to execute

Last modified: Thu, 15 Apr 21 08:11:13 -0700

Current Computer Chess Club Forums at Talkchess. This site by Sean Mintz.