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Subject: Re: The Chess Room Argument [by John R. Searle]

Author: Christophe Theron

Date: 22:45:25 03/18/01

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On March 18, 2001 at 23:19:24, Robin Smith wrote:

>On March 18, 2001 at 21:47:16, Christophe Theron wrote:
>
>>On March 18, 2001 at 15:29:12, Dan Newman wrote:
>>
>>>On March 16, 2001 at 22:18:23, Robin Smith wrote:
>>>
>>>>On March 15, 2001 at 05:41:33, Dan Andersson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>I could not agree more. A good reference for furter reading is Daniel C.
>>>>>Dennet's 'Consciousness explained.' It is a wonder of clarity and puts the
>>>>>question to many antique notions IMO.
>>>>>
>>>>>Regards Dan Andersson
>>>>
>>>>I have read Dennet's 'Consciousness explained' cover to cover.  To me it would
>>>>have been better titled 'Consciousness explained away.'  Although it tries, it
>>>>never does explain the problem of consciousness more than to say it is a figment
>>>>of our imagination.  What poppycock.  Who's imagination?
>>>>
>>>>Robin Smith
>>>
>>>I agree.  Dennet seems to take aim at the problem (as indicated by the
>>>title) but fails to explain anything except his own models of how
>>>various mental functions might work.  To some that may seem explanation
>>>enough.  I think it completely misses the point.  Those of us that see
>>>a mystery here weren't really puzzling over the details of the various
>>>kinds of mental activity (as interesting as that may be) but were
>>>instead looking at (what seems to us to be) a deeper problem/mystery.
>>>
>>>I'm not sure exactly what's going on, but there seem to be two sorts of
>>>people: those that see that there is a mystery and those that don't.
>>>This is very similar to what's going on in physics with one group of
>>>scientists who see mystery/deep philosophical implications in quantum
>>>mechanics and those that don't.  I'm not sure where the fault, if any,
>>>lies.  It could just be an emotional or philosophical bent that leads
>>>one person to "mystery" and another to prosaic explanations, or it
>>>could be a lack of perception of some sort (on either side).  Or perhaps
>>>lunacy.  Perhaps it's just a failure on the part of those that see the
>>>mystery to provide a convincing argument to those that haven't yet
>>>"seen" it.
>>>
>>>I suspect the latter.  The nature of the mystery of consciousness makes
>>>it very difficult to explicate.  I've tried for years to put it properly
>>>into words but have (I think) mostly failed.  I think the problem may
>>>come about because of a sort of vicious circularity, but I'm not sure.
>>>
>>>The problem is that on the one hand, when we observe the world around
>>>us, we don't see the mystery (of consciousness).  Everything seems (to
>>>those of us with a scientific bent) to be explicable in principle.
>>>The behavior of animals and humans, like the weather or any other
>>>physical phenomenon, seems to arise completely out of the interactions
>>>of their constituent parts (ultimately, particles, fields, and so forth)
>>>and have nothing of a mysterious sort involved.  For instance, it seems
>>>perfectly explicable how a person can look at something, a cow for
>>>instance, and then say, "I see a cow".  The light from the sun is
>>>scattered from the cow, impinges upon the lens of the eye, and is
>>>focused onto the retina where it is converted into electro-chemical
>>>signals which eventually enter the brain, get processed, etc. etc.
>>>Admittedly many of the details are very fuzzy, but the necessity of
>>>invoking anything extra beyond the physical seems nil.  But if you are
>>>that person (instead of the observer of that person) there seems to be
>>>something more, something which isn't at all required to explain what
>>>the observer sees.  It might be labeled conscious experience, or
>>>sensation, or being, or the buzz of being alive, or whatever, but
>>>whatever *it* is, it seems like it isn't at all required for things to
>>>be as they appear to be (to the observer of conscious entities) and
>>>seems to be entirely unconnected with any explanation of behavior that
>>>might be said to indicative of consciousness...
>>>
>>>Now, if you aren't very introspective or otherwise haven't observed
>>>this "phenomenon" within yourself, you likely will be very skeptical
>>>about its existence or importance.  And even if you have, you might
>>>be inclined to dismiss it as unimportant or irrelevant.  This (I
>>>suspect) is due entirely to personal preference and depends on your
>>>philosophical leanings (if you have any).  Or perhaps some of us aren't
>>>conscious and some are.  The ones that are not simply don't have this
>>>"experience" to report.  Maybe only I am conscious (after all I'm
>>>only inferring that others are because 1) I don't particularly relish
>>>the idea of living as a solipsist and 2) it's a simpler theory to
>>>imagine others are conscious too) :).
>>>
>>>I suspect consciousness is the ultimate mystery, or one of the ultimate
>>>mysteries to set along side such mysteries as the nature of time and
>>>space or the nature and origin of the cosmos.  It may be the sort of
>>>thing that can't ever be figured out.  After all, an explanation of a
>>>"thing" is always in terms of other "things" which themselves must be
>>>explained if we wish completeness.  It seems we can't extend this
>>>ad infinitum.  If we terminate at some level, we then have unexplained
>>>things (like axioms in mathematics).  If all is explained, the
>>>explanations must be, perforce, circular, and circular explanations
>>>seem worthless somehow...
>>>
>>>-Dan.
>>
>>
>>Sounds like chinese to me. :)
>>
>>Nice chinese BTW, but still... :)
>>
>>Seriously, I probably need to introspect a little bit more in order to try to
>>understand what some people find mysterious about "conscience".
>
>Imagine an alien race that flys to earth in a UFO and is studying humans.  They
>hear humans talk about things being "funny", or "falling in love", or something
>is "beautiful" or that they are "afraid".  But the aliens have no idea of these
>concepts.  They  have no equivalent to these concepts in their home world.  So
>they decide they will disect a human to find out the meaning these words.  But
>will they find "love" by disecting a brain or a neuron?  Maybe, but not unless
>their technology is more advanced than ours.  And if not, and when that doesn't
>work, lets say they study humans by doing a brain scan (MRI) of someone who is
>experiencing the emotion of fear.  Will the brain scan help them understand
>fear?  Sure, it will show what areas of the brain are active, or that the pupils
>of they eye have responded by dilating or that the sweat glands become active.
>But will they know what fear is like when it is *experienced*?  Again, not
>unless their technology is more advanced than ours.  Do you remember when you
>were young, learning the "facts of life" i.e. the mechanics of sex?  You then
>knew all about what happens ... first you do this, then this happens .....  But
>when you *experience* it, it is something else again.
>
>Another way to think about it is in terms of computer programming.  How would
>you go about programming a computer to feel afraid?  Of course you have no idea,
>since no one does.  You could program a robot to exhibit the same behaviors as a
>human that is afraid, but does this mean that the robot experiences the emotion
>of fear?  Who knows.  All we can see is the behavior.  We don't know how to peer
>into and see the subjective experience of others.
>
>My grandfather used to pooh-pooh the idea of gravity.  He would say "down is
>down and that is why things fall".  Most people just accept the facts presented
>to them by their experiences without question.  "Everyone knows" things fall
>down.  But then someone asks "why" and if an answer to the mystery of why things
>fall is found, suddenly we have Newtons laws of gravitation.
>
>We all have these subjective experiences.  But why?  Brains, sensory organs,
>hormones, DNA; these all explain the mechanics of our existance, but NONE of
>this knowledge would lead us to inevitably conjecture the existance of
>subjective experiences unless we already knew about them.  There is something we
>don't yet understand going on.
>
>Robin



Subjective experiences are defined by the states of the information processing
entity.

It's no wonder they cannot be transfered "as is" in another entity (which has a
different structure). So you are bound to look at "feelings" from the outside
and deduce what these feelings are only by the behaviour of the entity.

Your examples about love, fear, humour, beauty are certainly very romantic, but
it - again - sounds very old fashioned to me.

Some of these "feelings" will probably appear in very complex computing machines
and it will be possible to see it from the outside.

At the time there were no computers, and machines were made of gears, people
could have wondered how a machine could gather informations and do anything
useful with it, but now that we have computers of such complexity and that we
are foreseeing gigantic advances in this complexity, I think it is time to
update our way of thinking...

I'm not trying to contradict you by all means. It's just that I don't see
mysteries where you see them.



    Christophe



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